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BOOK REVIEW
DELINQUENTS, THEIR FAMILIES AND THE COMMUNITY. By C. Downing
Tait, Jr. M. D.t and Emory F. Hodges, Jr., M. D.$ Pp. xvii, 199.
Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1962. $6.75.
The question of delinquency is a problem that our society has been
attempting to solve for years and yet, with advanced scientific
methods and knowledge and with fuller acceptance of psychiatric
techniques, we still have failed to institute adequate preventive
measures. In fact, we are not sure what measures should be taken.
As a jurist, I have seen teenagers brought before the bar of justice
on a minor or petty charge. But because of their age, background or
social status, I have taken time to explain to them the rules which we
are expected to obey and that people in a civilized society have certain
duties and responsibilities to the public, to specific individuals, and
to property. And yet, within a few months, I have seen these youths
before be again charged with more serious crimes. Then I realize
that I have failed, that my short lecture had been useless, and that
this youngster is facing a life of crime and instability.
I have talked with criminologists, psychiatrists, social workers
and penologists on this point and it seems to me that they are as
confused and perplexed about the problem as are judges. Even though
we can predict which youth is going to fall next, we appear to be
helpless in preventing it. We take vaccines to prevent smallpox and
polio; we condemn unsanitary houses in order to prevent the spread
of disease; we install traffic lights at dangerous intersections in order
to prevent automobile accidents; and yet we have no plan to prevent
a youngster from falling into a life of crime.
Within the past fifteen years, government, realizing the conse-
quences of blighted neighborhoods, has entered into multi-million
dollar programs of urban renewal. City blocks have been cleared.
New and better housing has been provided for displaced families.
Play areas with open space and proper landscaping has been provided
for the children. In effect, we have removed the physical results of
t Instructor, Psychoanalytic Clinic for Training and Research, Department of
Psychiatry, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, New York
City.
*Research Psychiatrist, Commissioners Youth Council, Washington, D. C.
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blight, but have we treated the cause of such a condition? Families
have been uprooted from a social unit to which they belonged-a
social unit which needed them. Have we tried to rehabilitate these
families so that they can realize and understand that they owe certain
duties and obligations to members of their families and society? Un-
less this is done, the grand buildings of today will be the breeding
places of blight by 1980. Slums are not created by physical buildings
alone. Without people in these buildings such conditions do not
exist. The buildings have been replaced, but have the people who
lived in these structures been changed?
In 1954 Doctors Tait and Hodges set out to study juvenile delin-
quency as part of a city-wide program of the District of Columbia
Commissioner's Youth Council. Part I of the book reports their
conclusions.
In attempting to determine delinquents, the authors found that
predictions based on Glueck scores proved correct six or seven times
as often as incorrect. These scores are computed by method of pre-
dicting delinquency set forth by Professor Sheldon Glueck and Dr.
Eleanor Glueck. According to this system, five factors are rated:
discipline by the father, supervision by the mother, affection of the
father, affection of the mother, and cohesiveness of the family. A
score of 250 or more rates the child pre-delinquent.
Secondly, the authors report that results of the treatment program,
which consisted largely of social casework, indicated that the treated
group had no fewer, and possibly more, delinquents than the un-
treated group. These discouraging results forced them to search for
more effective methods of delinquency prevention. Thus, Part II of
the book is devoted to their proposals for a new approach.
The authors indicate that since the family is the heart of the
delinquency problem, the patient to be treated is, in most cases, the
family unit and not a particular individual. The authors recommend
that a
[F]amily planning unit be established which would include
representatives of the involved city agencies .... This fam-
ily planning unit would have responsibility for identification
of disabled families in the community, evaluation of them in
diagnostic and prognostic terms, planning and executing
treatment programs, maintenance of appropriate records,
making periodic reviews of the families and the treatment
results, and insuring the continued provision of services as
long as needed to deal with the family problems.'
1. P. 145
[Vol. 2: p. 131
BOOK REVIEWS
This process would reveal socially incompetent families. For these
families the authors suggest the intriguing and provocative plan of
establishing separate family therapeutic communities or family hos-
pitals.
These special sub-communities would be established within the
larger community and would be administered by personnel authorized
and trained to design a therapeutic environment to meet the family's
needs. The goals of such a program
[W]ould be to help these families rehabilitate themselves,
and meanwhile, to compensate for the failures in family
functioning whenever possible. Thus, for example, if a
mother failed to provide a meal for her children, the children
would still be fed.2
This proposal is similar to the system of family diagnosis operat-
ing in the Netherlands. Under the Dutch system only families diag-
nosed as anti-social are considered for admission to these special
camps. A family is provided with basic furniture for which they pay
in weekly installments. A social worker and a trained homemaker,
who help the mother with the housework, are assigned to the family.
The father's earnings are handed over to the bookkeeper who calcu-
lates whether or not it will cover the family's basic needs. If neces-
sary, a subsidy is given. In short, the family is supervised and
observed in a more or less controlled atmosphere.
Such a proposal raises many basic questions. Is this a function
that government should undertake? Is this undue interference with
a family's right to live where and how it wants? Would such a pro-
posal make these families more dependent upon public agencies?
Would the cost be prohibitive? Is a nation that cannot agree on a plan
of medical care for the aged prepared and willing to undertake such
a function? Will this lead us to complete socialization? Is it a cure-all
for all social sickness? The authors try to answer these questions,
but their views require scrutiny and closer examination by all inter-
ested in delinquency and in the broader problem of family social
problems. To these persons, I recommend this book, not because of
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JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW. By
Edgar Bodenheimer.tPp. xiv, 402. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1962. $8.75.
In this volume Professor Bodenheimer has augmented his earlier
work on jurisprudence.1 The stated purpose of this, as well as the
prior book, is to aid those who are interested in law as an instrument
of social policy. 2 The book is divided into three parts. Part I is
labelled an HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW,
and summarizes the various schools of jurisprudential thought. Part
II, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LAW, deals with what the
author believes to be the goals of a legal system. Part I, THE
SOURCES AND TECHNIQUES OF THE LAW, probes the methodology that
the institution of law utilizes in achieving its goals. The latter part
represents an important contribution to the literature of jurispru-
dence, and is perhaps the most significant aspect of this book.
In summarizing the various philosophical schools, Professor Boden-
heimer starts with the early Greeks and traces the development of
jurisprudential thought up to the contemporary value-oriented phi-
losophers. As the different legal theories are discussed, the concept
of justice is stressed. The reader later discovers that justice is an
important component of the author's philosophy of law. But this
emphasis on justice does not detract from the presentation that is
made in the first part of the book. However, it is an admittedly
difficult task to attempt to summarize a number of prolific philoso-
phers in the short space of 150 odd pages. The choice of material
must be somewhat arbitrary and coverage must be brief. Yet brevity 3
can result in an incomplete or distorted image of a philosophy. For
instance, in summarizing Pound's sociological jurisprudence, the
author first shows that Pound was influenced by James. He sets
forth Pound's theory of social interests, and then discusses Pound's
view of justice. Any summary of Pound's philosophy of law would
seem to be inadequate unless it dealt with the jural postulates and
their relationship or inter-relationship to the theory of social inter-
ests. Moreover, Pound's concept of the five stages of legal history is
worthy of mention. Similar criticism can be directed towards the
t Professor of Law, University of Utah; J.U.D., Heidelberg; LL.B., University
of Washington; B.A. in Law Librarianship, University of Washington.
1. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE (1940).
2. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, vii (1962).
3. An extreme example of brevity can be found In the author's six line
treatment of Max Weber. Id. at 105.
[Vol. 2: p. 134
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author's treatment of other philosophers. 4 Nevertheless, Professor
Bodenheimer has generally presented scholarly and interesting sum-
maries of the legal philosophers that he discusses.
The first part of the book is summarized in the last section of
chapter nine. It is at this point that the reader first receives some
concrete insight into the author's philosophy of law. 5 He poses the
question as to whether there is any rational thread running through
the perplexing multitude of legal theories. He feels that it is possible
to logically structure jurisprudence by adopting the meritorious con-
tributions of the various philosophies. This is called a synthetic
jurisprudence, and is viewed as superior to one-dimensional theories
of law. This eclectic approach utilizes scientific, societal, and other
nonlegal components of civilization to solve various legal problems.
Of the many problems that must be solved, the author thinks the
most eventful task confronting the law is the achievement of justice
in human relations.
Next the author analyzes the goals of a legal system. Man, he
asserts, is constantly searching for order. Law aids in this quest by
seeking to avoid chaos as well as anarchy and despotism. Moreover,
the order element must be linked to man's pursuit of justice; i.e., law
is a synthesis of order and justice. After distinguishing law from
other agencies of social control, the benefits and drawbacks of the
rule of law are investigated. The institution of law promotes cultural
pursuits and peace, as well as adjusting the conflicting interests of
society. The law, in fulfilling its functions, must not be too rigid or
inequitable. The author feels that a mature system of law must blend
rigidity with elasticity. In developing this analysis, Professor Bo-
denheimer thoroughly delves into the concepts of order and justice.
He constantly reiterates the importance of legal recognition of the
social and economic factors that shape society's institutions. At
times the author tends to be too lengthy, but on the whole the dis-
cussion is good, and discloses the author's strong humanistic bent.6
Part III scrutinizes the sources and techniques of the law. One
interesting and comprehensive chapter deals with the scientific
method and its relationship to law. The same can be said of the
chapter that discusses the judicial process. In the latter chapter the
4. In discussing Holmes, the author does little more than quote several
famous passages from his writings. This summary presents an incomplete and
distorted image of Holmes' philosophy.
5. This Is by design. The author states in the preface that little critical
commentary will be found in the first part of the book.
6. This part of the book has been severely criticized. Cohen, Book Review,
8 NATURAL L. F. 195 (1963).
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author does, however, espouse a debatable theory concerning the
doctrine of stare decisis. He feels that if a court decides to overrule a
precedent, it can refuse to apply the new principle to the instant case
on the basis of equitable estoppel. Prospective overruling, it is
argued, avoids the retroactive effect of overturning a precedent, and
is at least justifiable where one of the parties can prove reliance on
the old rule. In contrast to this thesis, it can be said that a statement
of prospective overruling in an opinion would be mere dictum which
would tend to promote uncertainty in the law. Furthermore, the fact
that there was reliance on a prior decision does not make the author's
argument any stronger. Every litigant assumes the inherent risk that
the court might discard a precedent in the disposition of his case. 7
Professor Bodenheimer presents a provocative analysis of the
sources of law, formal and nonformal, which provide a frame of ref-
erence for the judiciary. Formal sources of law are "sources which
are available in an articulated textual formulation embodied in an
authoritative legal document."8 He ably probes the formal sources-
precedent and the various species of legislation. The comments per-
taining to the characteristics of legislation are especially worthy of
perusal.
One of the most absorbing chapters in the book is the one that
deals with the nonformal sources of law. The author defines non-
formal sources of law as "legally significant materials and considera-
tions which have not received an authoritative or at least articulated
formulation and embodiment in a formalized legal document." 9 Non-
formal sources of law are important points of reference to the judge
who must decide a case that is not controlled by a positive legal norm.
Professor Bodenheimer believes that a theory of nonformal sources
of law is imperative in view of the inability of the positive law to
deal with every conceivable situation. Accordingly, the author con-
structs a hierarchy of nonformal sources of law. As a general propo-
sition, he feels that a judge must follow the positive law, and cannot
depart from it even in the interest of justice. Justice can, however,
guide a judge in resolving questions that are unsettled by positive
law. Yet in the unusual hardship case the judge, subject to limita-
tions,1 0 can depart from the positive norm and dispense individual
7. For a comprehensive discussion of prospective overruling see Levy,
Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1960).
The author cites this and several other articles in note 21 on page 374.
8. BODENHEIMER, op. cit. supra note 2 at 271.
9. bid.
10. The judge's power to dispense individual equity would be limited to
cases that are subject to appellate review. Furthermore, the judge could only
exercise this prerogative where the application of a positive rule would yield an
[Vol. 2: p. 134
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equity in order to achieve justice. The scheme of this hierarchy also
permits courts to look to public policy, reason and the nature of
things, moral convictions, social trends, and customary law. Where
the foregoing conflict with fundamental standards of justice, the
latter becomes the preferred maxim. If custom defies a well estab-
lished public policy or strong social trend, the court is then free to
repudiate the custom under the test of reasonableness. In formulat-
ing this theory Professor Bodenheimer has definitely discussed the
nonformal sources of law and has used numerous well chosen ex-
amples to buttress his conclusions.
This book covers a wide range of ideas. Part I fulfills the need for
short summaries of the various legal philosophies. Many will dis-
agree with much of what is said in the last two parts of the book,
but this is to be expected, since the formulation of any legal philoso-
phy will prompt debate. However, this in no way detracts from the
author's efforts. As has already been pointed out, Part III is probably
the most significant aspect of this volume. In view of the fact that
many of our legal and social doctrines are now being reexamined, the
observations which Professor Bodenheimer makes in this latter part
are timely.
Richard D. G(ilardi*
unreasonable and wholly unacceptable result. Where a statute is involved, the
judge must also be able to conclude that the legislator would have created an
exception to the rule if he had foreseen the occurrence of the situation.
* Instructor, University of Virginia School of Law.
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